Battle of Borodino 1812: Napoleon, Kutuzov & Complete Field Guide

Borodino was a French victory that failed to solve Napoleon's strategic problem.

On 7 September 1812, Napoleon's Grande Armée fought the main Russian army under Mikhail Kutuzov west of Moscow. The French captured the principal Russian positions and held the battlefield. The Russian army withdrew intact enough to fight another day.

Why Kutuzov fought

Russian armies had retreated for weeks, surrendering territory and provoking criticism. Kutuzov, recently appointed commander-in-chief, needed to offer battle before Moscow.

The position near Borodino used villages, streams, ridges and hastily built fieldworks to strengthen the line.

The redoubts and flèches

The most famous positions were the Great Redoubt and the Bagration flèches—open-backed earthworks covering key approaches.

These were not permanent forts. Their value came from artillery, infantry support and the difficulty of attacking them under fire.

The battle opens

French attacks concentrated heavily against the Russian left and centre. The flèches changed hands repeatedly. Prince Bagration was mortally wounded, contributing to disruption in the Russian command structure.

The Great Redoubt

Later in the day, French cavalry and infantry finally captured the Great Redoubt after extremely heavy fighting. The Russian line bent and withdrew but did not dissolve.

Why Napoleon held back the Guard

The decision not to commit the Imperial Guard has become one of the battle's great arguments. Critics say a final reserve attack might have destroyed the Russian army. Napoleon faced a different reality: he was hundreds of miles inside Russia, with no replacement for his last elite reserve if the attack failed.

There is no way to prove the counterfactual.

Casualties

Exact totals vary by source, but both armies suffered tens of thousands of casualties in a single day. The scale made Borodino one of the bloodiest battles of the nineteenth century.

Moscow follows

Kutuzov decided not to fight again immediately and abandoned Moscow. Napoleon entered the city a week later.

That is why Borodino's result is so difficult to label. The French held the battlefield and reached Moscow, yet the Russian army survived and the political decision Napoleon wanted never came.

Battlefield victory versus strategic success

Borodino is a useful case study in the difference. A commander can take the enemy's position and still fail to achieve the purpose for which the battle was fought.

Related Regimental Record

• Napoleon's Invasion of Russia 1812
• Napoleon Bonaparte
• Leipzig 1813

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The battlefield from left to right

The Russian position extended across rolling ground broken by villages, streams and prepared earthworks. The Bagration flèches guarded the left-centre, while the Great Redoubt—often called the Raevsky Redoubt—anchored a key part of the centre-right.

These positions were powerful but not continuous fortifications. Gaps between them had to be covered by infantry, cavalry and artillery. The battle therefore became a series of attacks on strongpoints linked by open ground.

Shevardino: the battle before the battle

Two days before the main action, fighting around the Shevardino Redoubt helped cover the Russian deployment and revealed the direction of French concentration. The Russians eventually abandoned the position.

This preliminary fight mattered because it compressed the armies and gave Napoleon a clearer view of the Russian left.

Davout's turning proposal

Marshal Davout reportedly proposed a wider move around the Russian left. Napoleon rejected an operation that would have required additional time and movement away from the direct route toward Moscow.

Whether the proposed manoeuvre would have worked is unknowable. What is clear is that Napoleon chose a largely frontal battle designed to break the Russian army through repeated pressure.

The struggle for the flèches

French corps under Davout and Ney attacked the Bagration positions repeatedly. The earthworks changed hands amid extremely heavy artillery and musket fire. Bagration was wounded, and Russian command on that sector became more difficult.

The French eventually gained the ground, but at enormous cost and without producing the immediate collapse Napoleon needed.

The Great Redoubt

The Raevsky position became the focus later in the day. French infantry and cavalry finally penetrated it, with mounted troops entering around or into the work during the assault.

Capturing the redoubt forced the Russian line back, yet reserves and surviving formations prevented rout.

Cavalry raids in the Russian rear

Russian cavalry under Uvarov and Cossacks under Platov moved against the French flank and rear during the battle. The attack achieved limited direct destruction but caused delay and uncertainty.

Even a tactically modest raid can matter if it makes a commander hesitate at the moment reserves might otherwise be committed.

The Imperial Guard debate

Several marshals wanted Napoleon to commit the Guard to exploit Russian weakness. He refused. Historians have argued over the decision ever since.

From Napoleon's perspective, the Guard was his final reserve deep inside hostile territory. From the critics' perspective, preserving it meant allowing Kutuzov's army to escape. Both arguments depend on a counterfactual that can never be tested.

Casualties and endurance

Estimates differ substantially, but the combined losses were extraordinary. Senior officers fell on both sides, units were reduced and ammunition expenditure was immense.

Kutuzov withdrew because the army had been battered, not because it was annihilated. Napoleon held the field, yet his victory lacked the prisoner haul or organisational destruction that had followed battles such as Austerlitz.

Why Borodino failed strategically

The campaign required more than access to Moscow. Napoleon needed a Russian political decision. Because the Russian army survived, Alexander still possessed an instrument of resistance.

That is why the distinction between battlefield possession and strategic decision is essential. Borodino opened the road to Moscow while leaving the war itself unresolved.

Sources & further reading

• Russian and French official reports from the 1812 campaign.
• Memoirs from officers and soldiers on both sides, cross-checked against operational records.
• Modern battlefield and campaign scholarship.