Jacobite Rising 1745–46: Prestonpans, Derby, Falkirk & Complete Campaign Guide

The Jacobite Rising of 1745 was far more dangerous to the British state than its final defeat at Culloden can make it appear.

Charles Edward Stuart landed in Scotland with little foreign support and no large invasion army. Within months his supporters had taken Edinburgh, defeated a government army at Prestonpans and marched deep into England.

Why Jacobitism survived

The movement sought restoration of the exiled Stuart line. Support varied by region, religion, family interest and politics. It was not simply a Highland clan rebellion, although Highland military manpower became central to the 1745 campaign.

Charles lands in Scotland

Charles arrived in the Hebrides in July 1745. Several leading figures initially warned against rising, but support grew as clans and other Jacobites mobilised.

Prestonpans

On 21 September, Jacobite forces attacked Sir John Cope's army near Prestonpans. The government line collapsed quickly under the assault.

The victory gave the rising weapons, confidence and political momentum.

The march into England

The Jacobite army crossed the border, took Carlisle and advanced through Manchester to Derby. London was alarmed, but English Jacobite support remained limited and French invasion support had not materialised.

Why they turned back

At Derby, Jacobite commanders debated the intelligence picture. Government armies were converging, promised support was uncertain and their communications stretched north.

The retreat decision remains one of the most contested moments of the rising. It was not proof that defeat was inevitable, but it reflected a genuine strategic risk.

Falkirk Muir

During the retreat into Scotland, Jacobites defeated another government force at Falkirk Muir in January 1746. Yet the victory did not restore strategic momentum.

The road to Culloden

By spring, the Jacobite army was tired, short of supplies and increasingly constrained. Cumberland's government force was better supplied and trained for the coming battle.

At Culloden on 16 April, Charles accepted battle on ground poorly suited to the strengths of the Highland charge.

After the defeat

The government's response went beyond battlefield pursuit. Executions, transportation, disarming measures and attempts to break the military power of Highland society followed.

Why the rising matters

It was the final major attempt to restore the Stuarts by force, but it was also a European event shaped by war with France and by the military transformation of the British state.

Related Regimental Record

• Culloden 1746
• Glorious Revolution 1688
• Crowns & Kingdoms

Who actually joined the rising?

Jacobite support did not map neatly onto Highland versus Lowland, Catholic versus Protestant or Scotland versus England. Clan loyalties, dynastic belief, local rivalries, religion and calculation all influenced participation.

The army that formed around Charles Edward Stuart included Highland regiments, Lowland units and later Irish and Scottish troops in French service. Many Scots opposed the rising and served in government forces.

Prestonpans: speed and surprise

Sir John Cope's government army occupied ground east of Edinburgh with difficult terrain protecting parts of its front. Jacobite guides found a route through marshy ground during the night, allowing Charles's army to deploy close to the government position before dawn.

The Highland attack developed quickly. Government cavalry fled or became disordered, infantry cohesion broke and the battle was over in a short time. The victory gave the Jacobites captured weapons and an enormous psychological lift.

Why England did not rise

Jacobite planning hoped that English supporters would join in large numbers and that France might invade. Some recruits appeared, particularly around Manchester, but nothing close to the expected mass movement materialised.

This created a strategic contradiction. The army was advancing deeper into England while the political uprising meant to justify that risk was failing to appear.

Derby: the hardest decision

By early December the Jacobites were at Derby. London was alarmed, yet government forces remained in the field and intelligence about their positions was incomplete. The Jacobite command council debated whether continuing south offered a realistic path to political collapse or simply risked encirclement.

Charles wanted to advance. Senior commanders favoured retreat. The decision to turn north preserved the army but surrendered the initiative and damaged confidence in the prince's leadership.

Falkirk Muir

The retreat did not mean immediate defeat. In January 1746, Jacobite forces defeated a government army under Henry Hawley at Falkirk. Poor weather, cavalry disorder and aggressive Highland infantry contributed to the result.

Yet the Jacobites could not turn the victory into a strategic recovery. Supply, desertion and government reinforcement continued to narrow their options.

The French connection

France viewed the rising through the wider War of the Austrian Succession. Supporting Jacobites could distract Britain, but French priorities did not always align with Charles's hopes. Arms, money and some troops reached Scotland; the large invasion support imagined by Jacobite planners did not arrive in time.

Government adaptation

After early defeats, government forces trained specifically for Highland attacks, improved logistics and concentrated under the Duke of Cumberland. The army that reached Culloden was not simply the same force that had broken at Prestonpans.

That adaptation is central to understanding the final battle. Campaigns change armies.

The rising after Culloden

Organised field resistance collapsed, but the government's objective went beyond dispersing one army. Search operations, arrests, executions, transportation and legislation were used to reduce the possibility of another armed Stuart challenge.

The later romantic image of tartan, loyalty and doomed heroism should not obscure the political violence of the aftermath or the diversity of people who had opposed the Jacobite cause.

Sources & further reading

• Jacobite and government correspondence from 1745–46.
• National Trust for Scotland research on Culloden and the rising.
• Christopher Duffy and other modern campaign studies.